San Bernardino District - Civil 247 West Third Street

San Bernardino, CA. 924150210

CASE NO: CIVDS1507221

LEANE LEE 12277 APPLE VALLEY ROAD #311 APPLE VALLEY CA 92308

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE and NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

IN RE: LEANE LEE -V- TOWN OF APPLE VALLEY

THIS CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO: DAVID COHN IN DEPARTMENT S37 FOR ALL PURPOSES.

Notice is hereby given that the above-entitled case has been set for Trial Setting Conference at the court located at 247 WEST THIRD STREET SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92415-0210.

HEARING DATE: 11/17/15 at 8:30 in Dept. S37

DATE: 05/20/15 Christina M. Volkers, Clerk of the Court

By: ANDY DIAZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I am a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino at the above listed address. I am not a party to this action and on the date and place shown below, I served a copy of the above listed notice:

- () Enclosed in a sealed envelope mailed to the interested party addressed above, for collection and mailing this date, following standard Court practices.
- () Enclosed in a sealed envelope, first class postage prepaid in the U.S. mail at the location shown above, mailed to the interested party and addressed as shown above, or as shown on the attached listing.
- (A copy of this notice was given to the filing party at the counter () A copy of this notice was placed in the bin located at this office and identified as the location for the above law firm's collection of file stamped documents.

Date of Mailing: 05/20/15

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 05/20/15 at San Bernardino, CA

BY: ANDY DIAZ

1 2	LEANE LEE, PRO PER 12277 Apple Valley Road, #311 Apple Valley, CA 92308 (760) 413-4427			SUPERIOR CO COUNTY OF SAN BEST	DURT E D
3	(760) 413-4427			MAV	RDINO DISTRICT
4				BY	? 0 2015
5	CLIDEDIOD COURT OF CALIFORNIA				
6	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ANDREW DIAZ, DEDUTY				
7					
8	LEANE LEE)	CASE NO.	CIVDS 1507221	
9	Petitioner)			
10)	VERIFIED P	ETITION FOR WR	IT OF
11	v)	MANDATE	AND COMPLAINT	FOR
12)	INJUNCTIV	E AND DECLARA	TORY
13	TOWN OF APPLE VALLEY, a Municipal)	RELIEF		
14	Corporation)			
15	Respondent)			
16					
17	The following allegations are based on information and belief, unless otherwise specified:				
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19	INTRODUCTION				
20	1. The conduct of the public's business should not be a game of hide and seek with the				
21	public funds and records by public officials charged with the fiduciary responsibility to conduct on				
22	behalf of, representative of, and in view of the public at large. This is of primary importance in all				
23	actions and behaviors that encumber, expend, disburse, commit and yes, even squander public				
24	funds.				
25					,
26					
27					
28	Page 1 of 18				

- 2. The public at large has for centuries been afforded rights pursuant to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of California, which every public official swears an oath to defend. California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Government Code 6250 et seq), (enacted in 1968), the Legislature declared "access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is fundamental and a necessary right of every person in this state." CPRA was patterned after the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) codified in 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., for the purpose of giving the public access to information in the possession of public agencies
- 3. Pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA Gov. Code Section 6250 et seq), it is a well known precept that records be disclosed to the public upon request, and provides for a balancing test prior to withholding records, if the public interest clearly outweighs the public interest in not disclosing. Further, almost every case law states CPRA is to be broadly construed, and exemptions are to be narrowly construed; *County of Los Angeles v Superior Court (Anderson-Barker)* (2012) 211 Cal. App.4th 57; *County of Los Angeles v Superior Court (Barker)* (2012) Cal. App. 4th.
- 4. Further, CPRA Section 6254 makes provision in the event a record contains exempt information in the case of pending litigation, it must be redacted to allow for disclosure of the remaining record. This option was in fact included in the original CPRA request letter of the Petitioner, see Exhibit A
- 5. Finally, if records are improperly withheld from a member of the public, the public may enforce, in court, their right to inspect or copy those records and receive payment for court costs and attorney's fees (CPRA Gov, Code 6258 and 6259) *Filarsky v Superior Court* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 423.
- 6. When a record contains exempt material, it does not necessarily mean that the entire record may be withheld from disclosure. Rather, the general rule is that the exempt material may be withheld but the remainder of the record may be disclosed (CPRA Gov. Code 6253(a);

 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 447;

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Connell v Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal. App.4th 601; State Bd. Of Equalization v Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1187.

In the case of County of Los Angeles Bd. Of Supervisors v Superior Court (2015) Cal. App. 4th, the court ruled pursuant to Evidence Code Section 952, that invoices were a confidential communication and exempt from disclosure under Gov. Code 6254 (k), but also went on to say, in conclusion, "Because we conclude the County met its preliminary burden to show the requested records were confidential communications within the meaning of Evidence Code 952, we grant the County's petition and order the superior court to vacate its order compelling disclosure. In light of our conclusion, we do not reach the parties' contentions regarding application of the CPRA's 'catchall' exemption or Business and Professions Code section 6149 and 6148." In addition, in their Footnote 6, stated, "Because we conclude the attorney-client privilege precludes discovery of the billing records, we express no opinion as to whether the information contained in the billing records might be discoverable by some other means." And finally, the court stated "Moreover, we must construe Evidence Code Section 952 to avoid absurd results and effectuate the Legislature's intent." Further, "As noted, Evidence Code Section 952 defines 'confidential communication' for purposes of attorney client privilege. It states as used in this article...discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client..." Petitioner asserts also that a number of third parties within the employment of Respondent, have access and knowledge of the invoices, not just those in a high level management position, nor restricted to a single department within the organization.

Further in Footnote 5 the court states, "...a litigant might be required to reveal some information in camera to enable the court to determine whether a communication is subject to the attorney client privilege, (Cosco, supra 47 Cal. 4th at p. 737.) Evidence Code 915 'does not prohibit disclosure or examination of other information to permit the court to evaluate the basis for the claim' of privilege, such as whether the privilege is held by the party asserting it, whether the attorney client relationship existed at the time the communication was made, or whether the

client intended the communication to be confidential, (Cosco, at p. 737,) and a party is free to request an in camera review of the communications at issue to aid the court, (Id. At p. 740.)

Petitioner's position is the above is not supportive of Respondent's claim in using the attorney client exemption for disclosure. As the facts will show, Respondent is claiming attorney client privilege:

- A) Of an attorney's retainer agreement with a pubic agency
- B) Of a non attorney third party, see Exhibit J, *People v Gionis* (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 1196, 1210, "We cannot endorse the...view that the attorney client privilege applies whenever issues touching upon legal matters are discussed with an attorney. That has never been the law. Significantly, a communication is not privileged, even though it may involve a legal matter, if it has no relation to any professional relationship of the attorney with the client...Moreover, it is not enough that the client seek advise from an attorney; such advise must be sought from the attorney 'in his professional capacity.'...the privilege also does not apply when the attorney acts merely as a negotiator for the client or is providing business advice,,,the relationship between the parties to the communication is not one of attorney client."

In *Cosco*, *supra*, 47 Cal. App. At p. 732, "While the invoices themselves are privileged, information that is not otherwise privilege does not become so merely by being transmitted to, or ...from an attorney...it does not extend to subject matter otherwise unprivileged merely because that subject matter has been communicated to the attorney...Therefore, to the extent the information sought is available in a non-privileged source, the fact the invoices are privileged does not necessarily protect the information itself."

- C) Disclosure to a third party, see Exhibit E, as cited above.
- D) Based on an ABSURD result in violation of legislative intent by both the attorney and the client taking actions in violation of the Government Codes, including the Brown Act, and using the attorney client privilege as a shield to cover up their willful and knowing illegal and unethical acts and omissions, with the express intent to secret and suppress from the public, the contractual

agreements with third parties, and the amount of public funds spent for such third parties, and the additional financial benefit to Respondent's attorney through this methodology, as content in the attorney invoices, and violating the public right to know the contracts being funded, and the legislative votes in support, opposition or abstention to such encumbrances of public funds, thereby funneling such unknown expenses and purpose into Enterprise funds for the purpose of artificially inflating the cost basis to determine rate increases, and to knowingly and falsely enrich, ultimately the general fund, in violation of California Proposition 218. As the town claims a right of nexus to the various undisclosed expenses, so is the nexus of Petitioner's right to access as alleged in this writ.

Petitioner further cites the *California Rules of Professional Conduct (CRPC)*, Rule 3-600 (ABA MAR 1.13), which imparts upon the attorney the duty when it is known the organization represented by their acts or omissions violates the law that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, should seek options of reconsideration by the organization or refer the matter to a higher authority, and failing those options, where appropriate, exercise the duty to resign in accordance with Rule 3-700. Further, Rule 4-210 has been violated by the attorney, wherein "A member shall not directly, indirectly pay or agree to pay, guarantee, represent, or sanction a representation that the member or member's law firm will pay the personal or business expenses of a prospective or existing client..." and then noting exceptions, however, if the client has agreed to such acts, it has done so in an illegal act. Finally, pursuant to Rule 5-220, "A member shall not suppress any evidence that the member or the member's client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce evidence."

It is this case specifically that expenditure of public funds is the greater prevailing weight in favor of disclosure because the public interest is at risk of the potential irreparable and substantial financial injury from the abuse and or misuse of public funds. Further, to affirm the acts and omissions in this case would set the stage for public agencies to avoid all other laws, rules, and regulations governing the contracting activities of a public agency, including federal

laws, and California Codes related to public contracts, etc., and render moot the legislative and judicial authorities and remedies.

PARTIES

- 7. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, to compel Respondent to comply with their clear and present duty under the United States and California Constitutions, Codes of the State of California, CPRA, the California Brown Act and California Proposition 218.
- 8. Petitioner is a taxpayer in San Bernardino County and has paid taxes in San Bernardino County every year since 2007, up to and including 2015, and a resident of the Town of Apple Valley. Petitioner has a beneficial interest in the accurate disclosure of the use of public funds, and has no other adequate remedies available, having standing to seek this action.
- 9. Respondent, Town of Apple Valley is a municipal corporation formed in 1988, up to and including 2015.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 10. This Court has jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure Sections 525, 526a,1060 and 1085.
- 11. Venue is proper in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County under Civil Code of Procedure Sections 393 and 394, because Respondent in this action is a public agency situated in San Bernardino County and because all of the acts and omissions complained of in this Petition took place in San Bernardino County.

FACTS

12. Currently Respondent is operating at least three funds with a deficit, and in recent past years significant portions of expenses, related to legal fees, have been the subject of fund transfers. These ever increasing legal fees, while each year are originally budgeted at a reasonably low level, have been moved through fund transfers and the resulting actual total of legal expenses

transferred does not appear publicly until almost two years after the fact in the public budgeting process. Such fund expenses are being transferred through restricted Enterprise Fund accounts in a shell game fashion. See Exhibit B attached hereto.

- services" and incorrectly categorizing those "other" services as "legal services." When all these incorrectly categorized service expenses are transferred to an enterprise fund such as the sewer fund, that is in addition to the General Fund allocations already being made for the Town Attorney. That in turn artificially inflates the basis for calculating sewer rate increases, and can have the potential to violate California Proposition 218, governing how, and in what manner such fees can be increased. This behavior is nothing less than an attempt to circumvent the laws of the State of California as voted by the people, and constitutes an abuse of discretion. The only recourse available to the public, to ascertain the validity of such "other" service expenses, is by reviewing all the legal services invoices where these "other" service expenses are being secreted, and transferred hither and yon.
- 14. As the following list will show, there have been significant expenditures, including Petitioner's request on a warrant for \$149,644.79, and together with the following list of warrants, totals \$979,087.47 in legal services, and potentially "other" services. Further, there are many additional expenditures which are not contained on the warrant registers, and are being processed by electronic wire transfer and not disclosed on the public warrant registers. An example, shown in Exhibit C, where Hayward Consulting received a wire transfer payment, and then a warrant (#110134) payment, also not included in the public warrant register. The exclusion of the warrant page was not by accident, it was by design, as has occurred in the past.:

Best Best & Krieger warrants:

#109232 dated 10/30/14 in the amount of \$205,884.19 #108076 dated 08/14/14 in the amount of \$73,227.40 #107931 dated 08/08/14 in the amount of \$57,743.08

#107165 dated 06/26/14 in the amount of \$99,521.82 #106576 dated 05/22/14 in the amount of \$51,600.01 #106481 dated 05/21/14 in the amount of \$16,036.42 #105674 dated 04/17/14 in the amount of \$43,706.35 #105420 dated 03/26/14 in the amount of \$59,171.55 #104800 dated 02/27/14 in the amount of \$46,748.90 #104355 dated 01/30/14 in the amount of \$57,161.36 #103889 dated 12/17/13 in the amount of \$56,748.49 #103667 dated 12/11/13 in the amount of \$61,893.11

Are we to truly believe the \$149,644.79 warrant did not include any monthly retainer costs, and if so, then it reaffirms the public's concerns regarding the expenditure of public funds? It is simply incredulous to think a basic contract for a municipal attorney is not a public record. There is simply no defense for this, and to affirm this failure to disclose the contract would set history and the people's rights back hundreds of years. This was nothing more than an arbitrary and capricious act..

- 15. On April 13, 2015, Petitioner submitted to Respondent a letter requesting public records identified as follows and shown in Exhibit A, attached hereto:
- A. Backup documentation, invoices, contracts and prior expenditures, warrants, electronic transfers, and appurtenant records supporting and/or related to:
 - 1) Warrant #110475 dated 2/6/15 to Hayward Consulting Group for "contract for appraisal services" in the amount of \$45,089.88 on the Town Council Agenda for action on 4/14/15.
 - Warrant #110495 dated 2/9/15 to BB&K ICO American Express for "Trademark" services in the amount of \$149,644.79 on the Town Council agenda for action on 4/14/15.
 - 3) Warrant #110504 dated 2/9/15 to Daily Press ICO American

Express for "ADS" services in the amount of \$8,583.98 on the Town Council agenda for action on 4/14/15.

- B. Adopted Budget of Respondent for Fiscal Year 2008-2009.
- C. Contract with True North Research, invoices and payments, for phone survey report of August, 2014, related to the take over of Apple Valley Ranchos Water.
- D. Contract with 20/20 Network dated 2/24/15, and invoices and payments to date for Public Relations services.
- determination be made due to the imminent action of the Council, and that time was of the essence. The public, nor Petitioner, had any knowledge of the warrants until Friday, April 10, 2015 when the agenda was posted, and after Town Hall was closed for the remainder of the weekend. The aforementioned request was submitted the first thing Monday morning, April 13, 2015, regarding matters currently on the Town Council agenda to be acted upon the night of April 14, 2015, obviously very current and active material before the Council.
- 17. The request to see the Respondent's Adopted Budget was based on the fact that the Respondent's website link to the document pulls up the wrong budget year. Petitioner had requested in early March, 2015, that the link be fixed, and as of May 11, 2015, Respondent was still promising to fix the link.
- 18. The request for the True North Research contract was based on the fact that no such contract ever came before the Council in open session, nor was there any report out of closed session for reportable action, and no payments were ever processed on the public warrant registers to pay for the services, even though the survey results were revealed in a special presentation at a Council meeting on 08/27/2014. The only public reference was a statement by Frank Robinson, Town Manager, on 07/08/2014, under Town Manager Comments and Legislative Update, "that due to the overwhelming response from the Public Utility Commission Hearings, the "Town" had decided to conduct a community satisfaction survey that will measure the attitude and opinions

of the community regarding the water company." There had been no prior closed session, and the closed session followed the Town Manager comments, and contained only Closed Session exemptions unrelated to the issue. The document ultimately provided, was not specific to the survey, which Respondent, frequently uses this same company, for a variety of community surveys. See Respondent's Meeting Minutes Exhibit D.

The document had no date. The document, as provided, showed there was the potential for the misuse and abuse of public funds by the substitution of this document to substantiate expenditures at any point in time of month or year.

- 19. The request for the 20/20 Network contract was based on the Daily Press news article of 03/15/2015, with the headline "Contract for PR services made a public record" and as shown in Exhibit E attached hereto. The contract was provided to the Daily Press and denied to Petitioner on the basis of a claim Respondent did not have it. This was nothing less than an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.
- 20. On April 23, 2015 Respondent stated, quoting the "unusual circumstances" clause as a reason for extending compliance with Petitioner's request for another 14 days, see letter attached as Exhibit F. Yet, after a sum total of 28 days, communications between the Office of the Town Clerk, Department of Finance and the Town Attorney, Respondent claimed to NOT have the contract document, invoices or records of payments.
- 21. Ultimately on May 7, 2015, when Petitioner contacted Respondent, Petitioner was advised Respondent was still awaiting a decision from the Town Attorney, and since Respondent offices would be closed on Friday, an appointment was made for Petitioner to come to Town Hall on Monday, May 11, 2015 at 9 AM. On May 11, 2015, Petitioner received the letter attached as Exhibit G from Respondent.

Note here, that the delay put forth by Respondent was allegedly due to the "voluminous" amount of documents. Of the sum total of 40 pages provided, 26 pages were related to two of the first three items requested, which were a part of the current council meeting at the time

of the request, and 10 pages were requested on the day of pickup after Petitioner reviewed the budget. It appears the remaining 4 pages must have been the "voluminous" amount that required 14 extra days to produce, although those 4 pages were produced on the day of pickup. Or was it the less than one page per day of the 26 pages, that amounted to the "voluminous" production that required an extension of two weeks? Then again, was it the remaining documents we are to believe, that in the first 10 day wait had not been determined to be "attorney client privilege" and would not be disclosed, and it required another 14 days for that determination? It would appear Respondent, from the beginning, had no intention of complying with the production of the documents requested, reaffirming the belief that the intent was to abuse their discretion and the actions were arbitrary and capricious, and in violation of CPRA.

- 22. On May 11, 2015, Petitioner received the following in response to her requests:
- A. Respondent claimed to have provided documents responsive to Petitioner's request. However, Respondent did NOT provide the contract nor the invoice for December, 2014. No acknowledgment nor explanation for the non-disclosure was given. This in fact, was a violation of CPRA Section 6253 by failing to state the reason, nor identifying the person responsible for the denial.
- B. No records pertaining to the BB&K warrant request were provided, with the statement the records were exempt from disclosure under CPRA and protected by "attorney client privilege," but failed pursuant to CPRA Section 6253 to identify the individual responsible for the denial.
- C. Records were provided on the Daily Press warrant, which in fact revealed what the public was seeing on public Town Council warrants, that late payments were, and are, being made by Respondent. In this case, invoices for October through December, 2014, were not issued a warrant and paid until February 9, 2015, when the invoice indicates on the last page if payment was not received within 10 days they would begin collection action. This certainly reaffirms the public concern regarding the finances and status of public funds, since it has become

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clear that Respondent is having problems paying their financial obligations on time, and the need for public disclosure of invoices which are taking large sums of money from Respondent's treasury

- D. The requested Budget information was provided.
- The request for the True North Research contract and invoices, while stating E. documents were provided in response to request, was anything but correct. Originally Petitioner received a three page proposal from True North Research, which contained not even a date nor any cost information, and no signatures which was allegedly provided by the Finance Department. This really does beg the question, why a document, so lacking in information would be in Finance in support of expenditures? When Petitioner questioned why the Town Clerk would not have contracts, staff managed to "locate" a four page document which was substituted for the 3 page proposal. Again, a document with no date, and could have been something related to any number of "citizen satisfaction" surveys frequently conducted by Respondent through this same company. Later, while reviewing the sum total of documents provided, it became apparent that this document was not what was requested. This document was for an RDD survey of 600, while the Apple Valley Ranchos Water Company survey was of 400, see Exhibit H attached hereto (the alleged 4 page "contract" and an excerpt from the survey results), and they appear to confirm that substitution of records is exactly what occurred given the lack of appropriate protocols for contracting and sets up the potential for misuse and abuse of public funds. This is nothing less than egregious. The denial was not in compliance with CPRA Section 6253 by failing to explain the denial of the additional documents requested, nor identifying the individual responsible for the denial.
- F. The request for the 20/20 Network contract, invoices and payments were refused on the basis Respondent does not have copies. Which is even more egregious than the prior act, given the prior disclosure to the local news media, as being effective until 12/31/2016.

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And yet, this very document has been **ARBITRARILY** and **CAPRICIOUSLY** denied to the Petitioner on the basis that Respondent does not have it, after taking 28 days, it still could not be found? This item in particular goes to the heart of the real problem with records requests posed to Respondent, because there is certainly no reason to believe the contractor has not been paid from public funds, but how can Respondent's Finance Department know what the correct payment should be if they have no contract, and where are the invoices or proof of payment? Has the Town Attorney added an additional administrative cost to the reimbursement billed on his invoice? Who would know?

Further is the fact that Exhibit E clearly indicates a preliminary strategic PR plan was prepared, suggesting it is a separate document from the contract. However, if the document was appropriate for disclosure to the news media, it is certainly unquestionably a document which should have been provided to Petitioner when requested. This again sets up the potential for misuse and abuse of public funds. This denial was a violation of CPRA Section 6270, which states, "...no state or local agency shall sell, exchange, furnish, or otherwise provide a public record subject to disclosure pursuant to this chapter to a private entity in a manner that prevents a state or local agency from providing the record directly pursuant to this chapter."

Finally, as seen in Chapter 2.10 of the Town Municipal Code, Section 2.10.030 (3) (4), attached as Exhibit I, shows that the Town Clerk is the official keeper of the records of Respondent, so it is obvious Respondent does not appear to be in compliance with their own ordinances, since the office of the Town Clerk simply does not have the records.

23. This is not a case of the public seeking information contained in contracts and in invoices that are some kind of exempt information, which could be redacted. This is a financial matter of concern to the public. On March 24, 2015, Petitioner attended a Town Council meeting where Councilwoman Stanton made a specific request of Marc Puckett, Finance Director, relating to information on Respondent's expenditures printed in the Apple Valley Ranchos Water Company mailer. Mr. Puckett responded by belying the facts and stated

Respondent had only spent \$40,000 on Bartle Wells. The court will note in Exhibit J, that Respondent actually spent almost double that, with almost another \$40,000 paid as a "reimbursement" on the BB&K invoice. Also hear the meeting audio/video DVD attached as Exhibit K, from 42:05 to 43:47 markers on the tape. Such incorrect statements on the expenditure of public funds, cannot be tolerated and the public needs, more than ever, to be granted immediate access to the public financial records of Respondent. It is this type of secret, false, misleading, hidden or omission of information on expenditures and contract actions that sets up an environment for the potential of misuse and abuse of public funds.

During the course of this public records request, and denial, Petitioner learned there are at least two more of the situations, where, based on Respondent's propensity for non-public contracting, non-public payment disclosures and denying contracts and invoices for payment, would indicate how extensive and long term the problem is. One is the Bartle Wells contract for expenditures, and also the company Fiona Hutton and Associates, another Public Relations firm, which have appeared on previously disclosed BB&K invoices as "reimbursements", and included in Exhibit J and noted in paragraph 14 above. These actions can amount to multi-millions of dollars that are potentially an opportunity for abuse and misuse of public funds.

- 24. A denial by the courts on access to the critical financial records, such as contracts and invoices, would further condone maintaining the status quo and foster an environment of incorrigibility as it relates to public funds. Some examples that go to the heart of this issue are:
- A. The City of Irwindale. In that instance third party contractors provided lavish trips to public officials, then billed the cost of those lavish trips on the third party contract invoices paid with public funds, and then the public officials put in for their travel per diem in addition to the already paid for trips, an act of double dipping. By securing contracts through a non public setting, as is the case with Respondent, this leaves a potential for misuse and abuse of public funds, and by restricting the public's access to the financial records pertaining to the expenditures of public funds, can result in significant economic losses to the public, and far

outweighs any interest in non-disclosure.

B. The City of Bell. As most everyone is aware, was the mother of all financial abuses and misuses. The questions that were asked over and over again were, how could this happen and the citizens not know about it? As was ultimately revealed, it was hidden by not providing requested public records, providing false information through public records requests, and inappropriate financial transactions which went undetected by the independent auditor for years. The courts have an obligation to make it possible for the public to access the records and documents necessary to safeguard public funds and examine the actions of their local legislators.

CAUSES OF ACTION

- 25. Respondent has demonstrated patterns of behavior, in violation of the public's rights, and in spite of the claims of being transparent, have shown complete contempt for transparency. Therefore, Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 24.
- 26. Respondent has a duty to promptly, and properly carry out the duties of office in compliance with the United States Constitution, California Constitution, the oaths of office, the Government Code of the State of California, including the Brown Act, and the Public Records Act, but have instead repeatedly demonstrated contempt for those legal obligations. Therefore, Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 24.
- 27. Respondent's actions have been beyond the pale of improper, actions were shielded by the misuse and abuse of the "attorney client privilege," including private, non attorney firms, claiming an "attorney client privilege." Such behavior has been reprehensible and a deliberate, unethical, and illegal suppression of the public's right to information. Therefore, Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 24.
 - 28. Respondent's actions have been an ongoing intimidation and action to dissuade

citizens from seeking public records, or examining the financial transactions by Respondent, putting forth unwarranted time delays, downright refusals to disclose, and putting up the barrier of legal action to enforce the public's rights. It is simply blatant contempt for the laws of the State of California. Therefore, Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 24.

29. Petitioner requests that a hearing be set at the earliest practicable opportunity as

- 29. Petitioner requests that a hearing be set at the earliest practicable opportunity as provided in Government Code Section 6258.
- 30. Petitioner requests the Court to conduct an in camera review of the records Respondent has failed to disclose, and such other subsequent records noted herein, outstanding and in question, and will be the subject of a followup CPRA request, having been discovered in this writ process..

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, petitioner prays that:

- 31. The Court issue a writ of mandate compelling Respondent to immediately perform their duties and produce the records as originally requested by Petitioner.
- 32. The Court issue a writ of mandate compelling Respondent to immediately perform their duties and produce the additional records identified through this legal process, those records being the Bartle Wells and Fiona Hutton and Associates contracts, invoices and payments, and the list of BB&K invoices identified in paragraph 14 of this Petition.
- 33. The Court issue a writ of mandate compelling Respondent to immediately comply with their own ordinances and properly retain all contract records with the Town Clerk.
- 34. The Court issue a writ of mandate compelling Respondent to immediately include both warrants and wire transfer expenditures on the public warrant register, and produce such warrant registers in their entirety, in a 30 day time frame, on the public agenda.
- 35. The Court issue a writ of mandate compelling Respondent to direct Respondent to comply with the California Public Contracts Code, statutory limits on contracts without public

VERIFICATION

I, Leane Lee, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury, I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action. I have read the foregoing verified petition for writ of mandate, and the facts alleged therein are within my knowledge and I know them to be true, except as to matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to these matters I believe them to be true.

Dated: May 19, 2015

Leane Lee